ABSTRACT As a new software paradigm, cloud computing provides services dynamically according to user requirements. However, it tends to disclose personal information due to collaborative computing and transparent interactions among software as a service (SaaS) services. We propose a private data disclosure checking method that can be applied to the collaboration interaction process. First, we describe the privacy requirement with ontology and description logic. Second, with dynamic description logic, we validate whether SaaS services are authorized to obtain a user's privacy attributes, to prevent unauthorized services from obtaining their private data. Third, we monitor authorized SaaS services to guarantee privacy requirements. Therefore, we can prevent users' private data from being used and propagated illegally. Finally, we propose privacy disclosure checking algorithms, and demonstrate their correctness and feasibility by experiments.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing is a model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction [1] . Some characteristics (such as service outsourcing, virtualization, distribution and multi-tenancy) of cloud computing enhance the service quality and save computing resources. For example, service outsourcing enhances service capability and specialization through service composition [2] . However, cloud computing is a collaboration computing and transparent interaction system [3] . Users' private data are shared during collaborative interaction and then stored or used by service participants [4] . Therefore, a user will lose control of personal data, which can easily lead to private data disclosure. For instance, in June 2013, approximately six million Facebook user personal email addresses and telephone numbers were disclosed . In August 2013, the same issue happened to thirty-eight million Adobe users; disclosed data included users' names, credit account information, credit expiry date, credit passwords and order information . In 2014, seventy million Target user archives were leaked, including bank accounts, telephone numbers, and email addresses.
Privacy was regarded as a type of human right in the beginning. In the domain of information systems and software engineering, privacy protection means the capability of preventing individual information from being collected, disclosed and stored by others [5] , [6] . In 2002, the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) developed the Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P). It provides a standard and machine-understandable privacy policy and matches with users' privacy preference when a web site is run, and then the users can select different services according to the results. Extensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) 2.0 extends the privacy policy profile. However, XACML, P3P policy and web service composition design were developed by different designers. During the process of privacy policy development, policy makers do not know what private data and limits of authority are needed when the service is running. Therefore, these techniques can hardly be applied to satisfy users' privacy protection requirements in a collaborative and transparent interaction environment.
Cloud computing is defined by three layer models: Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS) and Software as a Service (SaaS). For research on privacy protection in cloud computing, most scholars use conventional information security methods-for example, encryption and anonymity [7] . These methods are very effectively applied on PaaS and IaaS, such as data storage and network link transmission [8] . However, SaaS is a type of cooperative computing and a transparent and interactive system. In the process of the interaction, users' private data are shared by the service participants [9] . Because private data are transmitted as plain text in SaaS, it is difficult to protect it with conventional information security methods [10] . Only with the combination of privacy enforcement technology can the private data in cloud computing be better protected. Any application to meet users' functional requirements needs the composition of certain services in IaaS, PaaS and SaaS [11] . In this process, interactive private data must be plain text among SaaS services. Encryption can guarantee the security of private data in IaaS and PaaS, but in SaaS, private data must be decrypted. Therefore, whether the service accepting plain text satisfies users' requirement cannot be guaranteed by encryption or anonymity. Details are shown in Fig. 1 .
The gray box in Fig. 1 represents that the private data will be encrypted or anonymous when it is transmitted through IaaS and PaaS, which is invisible to the service participants of IaaS and PaaS. At the top of the gray box, interactive private data among SaaS services are plain text, which are visible to the service participants.
For instance, user A wants to buy an article of clothes on Amazon. First, A must tell Amazon his name, phone number, address, and other private information including credit card number if A chooses to pay for it online. In addition, Amazon must transmit this information to a shipper to deliver the clothes. In such a process, the following issues may exist:
(1) The private data of user A can be encrypted in the process of storage and transmission. However, it must be decrypted when it is transmitted to the shipper. Under this condition, solving issues such as ''whom to transmit'' and ''how to use'' private data becomes very important.
(2) User A's privacy requirement contains ''Whom to transmit the private data? What is the information used for? How long will it be used?''. Thus, the issue is whether Amazon or the shipper meets user A's privacy requirement when providing service.
Research on privacy enforcement technology orienting SaaS is mostly in the conceptual model stage. For example, AnupamDatta at CMU uses logical reasoning to protect privacy information in terms of different stages of software development [12] . Qun Ni at Purdue University put forward a privacy perceiving model based on roles [13] .
The rest of our paper is organized as follows: Section II introduces related works. Section III presents the privacy disclosure checking method, including a description of privacy attributes, privacy disclosure checking analysis, algorithms and framework. Section IV presents a case study and performance analysis. Section V concludes our work and describes future work.
II. RELATED WORK A. MODELING AND VERIFICATION OF PRIVACY REQUIREMENT
Tang et al. [14] formalized the multi-tenancy authorization system (MTAS), proposed extensions for finer-grained crosstenant trust and developed a prototype system to demonstrate the utility and practical feasibility. Hamadi et al. [15] proposed a privacy-aware web service protocol conceptual model and built a model of a service protocol integrating the privacy requirement with an extended state machine so that it becomes easier to develop and manage a privacyaware web service protocol with a model-driven method. Guermouche et al. [16] presented a method of exchanging privacy web service protocols, which extended the service protocol and built a privacy model based on rules and analyzed the exchangeability of the privacy service protocol by a finite-state machine. Mokhtari et al. [17] put forward a verification method of privacy time attributes in a web service protocol, which built a model of a private data maintenance period in a web service protocol by timed automata to verify whether the service protocol violated the maintenance period requirement of private data. Although those studies modeled and verified the privacy property in web service protocols, they mainly pointed to a single web service protocol without considering the privacy requirement in the service composition. She et al. [18] focused on access control validation at composition time, which may be used to control the service providers accessing the user's private data. Tout et al. [19] took advantage of both the Unified Modeling Language (UML) and the Aspect-Oriented Paradigm (AOP) to enforce Business Process Execution Language (BPEL) security policies. Li et al. [20] proposed a graph-transformation based framework to check whether an internal business process BPEL adheres to the organization's privacy policies.
B. MATCHING AND NEGOTIATION OF PRIVACY POLICY
Ke et al. [21] defined user and service provider privacy policies based on analysis of current privacy rules and proposed a privacy policy automatic matching method, which can check the type of private data, the objective of private data disclosure and the collector and maintenance period of private data. Wei et al. [22] researched private data protection policies in the application of pervasive computing, building a privacy model and privacy policy axiom by using many-sorted logic and description logic, and they proposed a reasoned method of privacy policy that can check the inconsistency among policies. Ke et al. [23] proposed a privacy negotiation method between the user and the service provider in cloud computing to achieve the privacy requirement. Tbahriti et al. [24] presented a negotiation protocol pointing to the inconsistency of user and service provider privacy policies and also put forward a privacy system in which a privacy policy based on P3P can be defined. Zhang and Fen [25] set up a framework of parsimonious semantic trust negotiation, which can greatly reduce the degree of disclosed privacy identity information without exchanging entire attribute certificates.
C. PRIVATE DATA DISCLOSURE AND RISK
Kolter et al. [26] proposed a user-centered private data log tool, which provides a visualized interface to display disclosed data in the past transaction. Liu et al. [27] provided a method of computing the service trust degree and presented an interface automata that can extend privacy semantics, by which a privacy model can be built for service composition behavior. In the meantime, it also provided a transforming method from BPEL to privacy interface automata and verified whether service composition behavior meets privacy-authorized constraints by formalism. Liu et al. [28] analyzed privacy disclosure and authorization in web service composition and used a minimum path algorithm to analyze the privacy authorization issue. Roy et al. [29] presented a privacy protection system, Airavat, a novel integration of decentralized information flow control (DIFC) and differential privacy, which prevents unauthorized leakage of sensitive data during computation and supports automatic declassification of the results when the latter do not violate individual privacy. Chou [30] analyzed privacy risk during the business process lifecycle in cloud computing and put forward an audit method. Sen et al. [31] presented a specification of privacy policies, tracked users' data flows, and built and operated a system to automate privacy policy compliance checking in Bing.
D. SUMMARY
In the lifecycle of SaaS service interaction, users' private data must be transparent. Encryption or anonymity can hardly guarantee privacy security in SaaS. In the collaborative In our paper, considering the characters of interaction among SaaS services, we propose a privacy disclosure checking method, design privacy attribute matching and supervision algorithms, and confirm the feasibility and effectiveness of our method by experiment. Our research scenario is at runtime among SaaS services. Details are shown in Fig. 2 .
III. PRIVACY DISCLOSURE CHECKING A. DESCRIPTION OF PRIVACY ATTRIBUTE
First, we suppose that the privacy property is collected through negotiation between the cloud service composer and the user.
We obtain the relationship of privacy attributes through mapping among knowledge ontologies and then describe it with an ontology tree. The ontology tree of privacy attributes is shown in Fig. 3 .
A thing is a root node, which is the super class of all privacy attributes. Except for the bottom layer, the relationship among all other layers is subsumed-namely, the relationship between class and subclass. For example, the class name includes the subclass realname and nickname. The bottom layer belongs to its upper layer. For example, Country, Province and City belong to Class Address.
Definition 1 (Privacy Attribute PA): We describe privacy attribute as 5-tuple; namely,
Issuer represents the mark of the privacy attribute to record the superclass and subclass of this privacy attribute class. Owner represents participants of the service composition and in the meantime represents the owner of the privacy attribute. Subject represents the name of one privacy attribute. PDA-S represents Privacy Disclosure Assertion of Service. Signature is the digital signature. Each privacy attribute corresponds to one conception in the privacy attribute ontology. Subject can be described as follows:
∨ C(dp 1 : D 1 , dp 2 : D 2 , dp 3 :
where C represents the class of the privacy attribute ontology; op i and dp i represent the object property and data property, respectively, that belong to the class, satisfying
∧ (dp i = dp j ); I i represents an instance of the privacy attribute ontology; and D i is one certain value or a constant.
Example 1: EBay design the privacy disclosure assertion of a user's name (Tom) as follows: users' names will be disclosed only to the shipper. Suppose the EBay digital signature is 101100010; the privacy attribute will be described as below:
<FirstName, EBay, Name(char: Tom), the Name of Tom can be disclosed to the shipper only by EBay, 101100010 > Definition 2 (Authorization Statement AS): AS is the constraint on SaaS services of privacy attributes, which means that while the SaaS service owns such privacy attributes, it must follow official or service renter rules and the law. This means that the exposure of every privacy attribute must satisfy AS to verify whether the SaaS service has the permission of the privacy attributes. We can use the following formula to express it.
Supposing authorizer = {offical, serviceRenter}, official means the official organization, and serviceRenter means the one who has the services rented. serverConstr equals the constraints according to the law or rules imposed by the official and service renter. A stipulates that the tenant must satisfy the assertion expression rule∨law. In addition, a valid AS should include signatures by the official or service renter. In the meantime, this signature should be included in the privacy attributes.
Example 2: AS released by EBay claimed that the reputation value of a VIP tenant of EBay should be more than 600, or the tenant should be a credit card tenant, whose bank credit is more than 6000. Such AS can be expressed as follows:
Definition 3 (Privacy Disclosure Assertion PDA):
A PDA is a constraint assertion, stipulating how the privacy items can be collected, disclosed and stored, which includes PDA s and PDA r . PDA s is transformed from service composition flow. PDA r is contained in the users' privacy requirement. Those can be expressed as below:
where C represents the privacy attribute class. When privacy items are requested by the SaaS service, only its corresponding class and subclass can be gained. op 1 : {ow 1 . . . ow n }, op 1 is an instance of a class. {ow 1 . . . ow n } is the corresponding SaaS services that obtain the instance. op 1 : {ow 1 . . . ow n } . . . op n : {ow 1 . . . ow n } means that the instances can be owned by those SaaS services.
means that the instances can be transmitted to those SaaS services, which stipulates the transmission path of the privacy attributes. op 1 : ow 1 (vt 1 ) . . . op n : ow n (vt n ) means the valid time of the instances held by the SaaS service. In the meantime, supposing the data type of vt i is integral, ow i is a 1-tuple predicate based on the data type of vt i . The predicate usually is ≥ a or ≤ a, in which a is a constant.
Example 3: Furniture company S wants to apply for a shop on EBay to sell furniture. The PDA that EBay set on the user's address is as follows:
Supposing S is the VIP seller of EBay. EBay requires that the buyer address will be disclosed only to the shipper and should be deleted within 2 h after the goods are delivered and the deal is finished. In this case, the PDA can be expressed as below:
Definition 4 (Privacy Disclosure Strategy PDS):
A PDS is an ordered sequence of PDA. We can express it as below:
To easily understand PDS, we adopt the Privacy Attribute Language (PAL)syntax. PAL is based on the description logic. The class, object and data of each privacy attribute correspond to conception, role and character, respectively. We designed a Privacy Description Logic Function: PDL(), and the transforming relationship is shown below: serverConstr ⊗ authorizer → serverConstr authorizer;
(PDL(subjConstr)); ownerConstr → ∃authorizerIs.PDL(ownerConstr)); serverConstr → ∃userIs.PDL(serverConstr)); In this paper, we analyze whether the SaaS service is authorized or obeys privacy requirements with dynamic description logic D-ALCO [32] . Suppose A and B are atomic concepts, C and D are descriptions of concepts, ϕ and ϕ are atomic formulas, p and q represent individuals, and R and S represent atomic roles. The concept constructors include {}, ¬, , ∀ and ∃, which represent enumeration, atomic negation, atomic intersection, value restriction and limited existential quantification, respectively. All concepts in D-ALCO can be obtained through production (6) .
Formula constructors ¬, ∨, ∧ and <> respectively represent negation, disjunction, conjunction and action exist assertion, respectively. All formulas can be obtained through production (7) .
Action constructors ?, ,; and * represent test, alternative, sequence and iteration, respectively. All actions can be achieved via production (8) .
Definition 5 (Privacy Analysis Atomic Action PAAA):
Suppose C i is a corresponding ontology conception name of all privacy attributes, and D is an ontology conception; then, C i ≡ D is a definition formula of privacy conception. Finite collection T is the set of definition formulas. If each conception name is shown no more than once at the left of the definition formulas, then T is called Pri_TBox. Given a Pri_TBox, set N A as a collection of atomic action names, privacy analysis atomic action π can be defined as below:
α (subject 1 , subject 2 , . . . subject n ) ≡ (P, E), where (1) α ∈ N A is an atomic action name;
(2) (subject 1 , subject 2 , . . . subject n ) is a finite sequence of a user's privacy attributes requested by the SaaS service; (3) P is the finite collection of AS and represents the precondition that must be satisfied to execute an action; (4) E is the finite collection of PDA and represents the result of the action execution; To any finite collection Pri-A composed of privacy analysis atomic action definition formulas, if each atomic action name is shown no more than once on the left side of an action definition formula, then Pri-A is called Pri-AABox.
For privacy analysis atomic action π ≡ α({ow x , ow y }{subject 1 , subject 2 , . . . . . . subject n }), the name of action α is request; namely, SaaS service ow x sends a request to ow y for privacy item subject i , then π request ≡ request(ow x , ow y , subject i ), which represents the process of SaaS service ow x obtaining the privacy item from ow y . Namely,
When ow x sends the request to ow y , ow x must checked whether it satisfies the AS. If ow x is an authorized service, then execute action π . ow y responds with the privacy item to ow x . If ow x is an unauthorized service, then do not execute action π. ow y will not disclose the privacy item to ow x . Under this circumstance, the service composer will invoke another SaaS service that meets the users' functional requirements and keep checking whether it is authorized until the ASis satisfied. Namely, that either PDA r is equivalent with PDA s or PDA r is contained in PDA s .
AS
(1) Equivalent: PDA s , which corresponds to privacy attribute instances obtained from the atomic action, is completely equivalent with PDA r , which corresponds to the privacy attribute instances from the users' privacy requirement. Namely,
(2) Containment: PDA s , which corresponds to the privacy attribute instance obtained from the atomic action, contains PDA r , which corresponds to the privacy attribute instance from the users' privacy requirement. In other words, PDA s is stricter than the user's privacy requirement. The privacy analysis atomic action is shown as Fig. 4 . In Fig. 4 , the red tags express a flow of service composition, and the red and green bold areas represent a privacy analysis atomic action. AS of SaaS services ow y and ow x are AS ow y and AS ow x , respectively. The red double arrow is the interaction between ow y and ow x , and the dotted green straight line expresses transformation of the interactions into PDA s . The slash dashed areas address the match between PDA s and PDA r .
C. PRIVACY DISCLOSURE CHECKING ALGORITHMS
Considering the collaborative interaction in SaaS, we propose the description method of privacy requirements and a privacy disclosure checking mechanism. We address the assumptions of our work as follows.
(1) Assumption I: To PaaS and IaaS, private data are protected with Cryptographic Service.
(2) Assumption II: SaaS Services is a conventional web service; (3) Assumption III: Business process execution is described by BPEL (the details of BPEL are addressed in section III-D).
Based on these assumptions, we design the requirementoriented privacy disclosure checking algorithms. 
Algorithm 1 (Privacy Disclosure Checking Algorithm PDCA):
The BPEL process is parsed with Xpath to obtain the invoke mark, where we use instrumentation to check whether the service is authorized by the service composer to obtain users' private data. If AS is satisfied, call algorithm 2 to supervise the execution, or else substitute the original service.
The first and second lines are input and output, respectively. The third line obtains the invoke mark with Xpath to parse the BPEL process. From the fourth to the fourteenth lines, first, obtain the invoke mark among the services in scope-namely, scope = service i ; second, check whether the service is a cryptographic service. If true, then there is no need to supervise until private data are decrypted, or else check whether the service is authorized by the service 
Algorithm 2 (Supervising Algorithm):
Service is supervised regarding whether it obeys the privacy requirement during the execution process. If it obeys, then increase the service trust degree value by a. If it violates any PDA in the privacy requirement, call the corresponding item in SLA to execute punishment. In the meantime, substitute the service with a candidate service.
The first and second lines of the algorithm are input and output, respectively. The third line initiates a privacy requirement PR queue. The fourth line enters PDA i into the queue. The fifth to the fifteen lines call algorithm 3to check whether the service violates the privacy requirement. The service trust degree is increased, or the service is punished according to the final result.
Algorithm 3 (Matching Algorithm):
The first line is the input, inputting privacy attributes required by the service provider and correspondent privacy attributes of the privacy requirement. The second line is the output, outputting the matching result. The value is set as 1 if true or else 0. 
D. PRIVACY DISCLOSURE CHECKING FRAMEWORK
BPEL is an XML-based language for the definition and execution of business processes by means of web service-based workflows. The definition of the business process contains global variables and workflow logic expressed as a composition of activities, where implicit or explicit scopes help define variables and activities at different visibility levels. In Table 1 , graphical symbols signify the basic activity, structured activity, event handler, punishment handler and privacy supervisor. Activities include primitives for communicating with other services(receive, invoke, and reply), for executing assignments (assign), for signaling faults (throw), for pausing (wait), and for stopping the execution of the process (terminate). All the primitives that communicate with the outside world use the BPEL supporting notion of partnerlink to describe with whom they want to communicate. Late binding is supported by using assign activities to change the endpoints associated with the partnerlinks at runtime. The activities sequence, while, repeatUntil, and if provide standard control structures to order activities and define loops and branches. pick is peculiar to the domain of concurrent and distributed systems and waits either for the first message (out of several incoming ones) to occur or for a time-out alarm to go off to execute the activities associated with such an event.
flow supports the concurrent execution of activities. Synchronization among the activities of a flow may be expressed using the supporting notion of links; a link can have a guard called transitionCondition. Since an activity can be the target of more than one link, it may define a joinCondition for evaluating the transitionCondition of each incoming link. By default, if the joinCondition of an activity evaluates to false, a fault is generated. Alternatively, BPEL supports Dead Path Elimination (DPE) to propagate a false condition rather than a fault over a path, thus disabling the activities along that path. forEach supports the sequential or concurrent execution of BPEL scopes: in the former case, the execution of its internal activities is serialized; in the latter case, they are executed as parallel flows.
Each scope may contain the definition of the following handlers:
An event handler reacts to an event by executing concurrently with the main activity of the scope the activity specified in its body. In BPEL, there are two types of events: message events, associated with incoming messages, and alarms based on timers. A privacy supervisor supervises whether the SaaS service obeys the privacy requirement.
A punishment handler punishes the SaaS service that violates the privacy requirement, which is discovered by a privacy supervisor.
Definition 6 (PAAA-BPEL Transformation):
Transforming PAAA into correspondent BPEL activities.
According to PAAArequest (ow x , ow y , subject i ) ≡ ({ow x ,subject i , ow y (subject i ), ¬ owns (ow x , subject i )}, {¬ ow y (subject i ), owns (ow x ,subject i )}),we list the transformation rules as follows:
(1) According to request (ow x , ow y , subject i ), obtain service participants ow x , ow y -that is, the ow x request ow y for the subject-which corresponds to the BPEL Receive activity.
request(ow x , ow y , subject i ) → Receive; (2) According to {¬ow y (subject i ), owns (ow x ,subject i )}, obtain the transmission path-that is, the ow y transmit subject to ow x -which corresponds to the BPEL Invoke activity. {¬ow y (subject i ), owns(ow x , subject i )} → Invoke; (3) The execution time of atomic actionrequest (ow x , ow y , subject i ) corresponds to the BPEL Wait activity. execution time(request (ow x , ow y , subject i ))→Wait; The privacy requirement-oriented privacy disclosure checking framework can be expressed with two layers, as shown in Fig. 5. 
1) ANALYSIS LAYER
The BPEL process is statically analyzed with the BPEL Analysis Engine before execution. The BPEL Analysis Engine is based on privacy analysis atomic action (PAAA) α (subject 1 , subject 2 , . . . subject n ) ≡ (P, E). The detailed analysis process is shown as follows.
In the beginning, we capture the invoke mark with Xpath and then insert probe AS a precondition of calling the service,
. If the precondition AS is unsatisfied, then terminate the BPEL process. If satisfied, then supervise the execution of the service with Supervisor, in which each privacy item {subject: name} corresponds with PDA in SLA.
2) SUPERVISING LAYER
When the BPEL process, which has been analyzed and instrumented, is executed, save the supervision log into the Supervision Log Repository. If precondition AS is unsatisfied for a service, then terminate the process and substitute the service with a candidate by using the BPEL Analysis Engine. If one or more PDA s in SLA are violated, then punish the service according to the corresponding punishment rules in SLA and decrease the trust degree.
IV. CASE STUDY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
According to the requirements of the theory and case, we extend BPEL version 2.0 and use it to simulate our method.
A. CASE STUDY
Tom wants to buy furniture through Service Composer SC. The AS from SC declares that the service must have a reputation value greater than 600 or credit greater than 6000 issued by a bank. Suppose Tom and SC achieve the following privacy requirements via negotiation.
(1) If providing a real name (realName) to the service, the user discloses private information including only office phone number (officePhone) and address without community (AddressWithoutCommunity);
(2) SC provides only realName, AddressWithoutCommunity and officePhone to E-commerce Service; (3) E-commerce Service provides only realName, AddressWithoutCommunity and officePhone to Seller; (4) Seller provides only realName, AddressWithoutCommunity and officePhone to Shipper; (5) After the termination of the BPEL process, SC and all service composition participants must automatically delete all users' privacy information within 10 min.
The service includes Customer (Tom), service composer SC and six associate participants: online purchase E-commerce Service, Seller (S), Shipper, Cryptographic Service, Platform Service and Infrastructure Service. Name, address, postcode and phone are customers' personal private data.
At the beginning of the transaction, Customer sends the order requirement (OrdReq) to Seller, and then Seller sends a message containing the privacy attributes required (PriReq) to SC. After SC receives the PriReq message, it checks the AS of E-commerce Service and Seller. If they are authorized, it returns the privacy attributes to E-commerce Service and sends the privacy attributes to Seller according to the privacy requirement.
Afterwards, the BPEL process is executed and provides the service for Customer. In the meantime, the BPEL process is supervised with the privacy requirement supervision mechanism. According to the supervising result, the service trust degree is increased or the service participants are punished. In Fig. 6 , to simplify this case, we merely depict Cryptographic Service, Platform Service and Infrastructure Service as the bottom layer of the E-commerce service. We do not discuss them because of assumption I in section III-C.
We use BPEL graphical notation to simulate the process of an online purchase scene case. Details are shown in Fig. 7 .
AS is expressed according to the scene case:
Privacy disclosure assertion PDA is obtained from the privacy requirement; details are shown as follows: From the transaction process simulated in Fig. 7 , we can see that E-commerce Service collects only users' realName, AddressWithoutCommunity, and officePhone and then sends these private data to the seller only. Similarly, the seller collects only the above private data and sends them to the shipper. In the same way, the shipper collects only the above private data and does not send them to others.
We supervise the BPEL process with a privacy requirement supervision mechanism to guarantee that services obey the privacy requirement. We also depict the supervising process with BPEL graphic notations. Details are shown in Fig. 8 .
The privacy requirement supervision mechanism is composed of AS checking and PDA monitoring. Through program instrumentation, we insert AS and PDA into the service composition BPEL process as a precondition and post-condition of the invoke mark, respectively. In this way, we can check whether the service is authorized and supervise whether the service obeys the privacy requirement in the process of transaction execution. We do not need to check whether SC is authorized because the designer of the BPEL SC scope is global, and its value is service. Therefore, we need only to supervise whether SC obeys the privacy requirement during the execution of the BPEL process. To minimize the effects on the execution time of the service, we arrange the execution of the privacy requirement supervisor (supervising PDA 1 , PDA 2 , PDA 3 ) to be parallel with the execution of the BPEL process. Details are shown in Fig.8 .
To supervise SC, E-commerce Service, Seller and Shipper, we first check AS (AS?; π ) * ; ¬AS?; if AS is true, then execute π and start the monitor to obtain evidence for collaborative interaction. The detailed process is as follows:
(1) SC Request (SC, realName) ≡ ({SC,realName, User (realName), ¬owns (SC,realName)}, {¬User (realName), owns (SC,realName)}).
Request (SC, AddressWithoutCommunity) ≡ ({SC,Addr essWithoutCommunity, User(AddressWithoutCommunity), ¬owns (SC,AddressWithoutCommunity)}, {¬User (AddressWithoutCommunity), owns (SC,AddressWithoutCommunity)}).
Request (SC, officePhone) ≡ ({SC,officePhone, User (officePhone), ¬owns (SC,officePhone)}, {¬User (officePhone), owns (SC,officePhone)}).
In the meantime, start monitoring SC to check whether there is a match with PDA 1 , PDA 2 , PDA 3 .
Request (E− commerce Service, realName) ≡ ({E− commerce Service, realName, SC (realName), ¬owns (E− commerce Service, realName)}, {¬SC (realName), owns (E− commerce Service,realName)}).
Request (E− commerce Service, AddressWithoutCommunity) ≡ ({E− commerce Service,AddressWithout Community, SC (AddressWithoutCommunity), ¬owns (E− commerce Service,AddressWithoutCommunity)}, {¬SC (AddressWithoutCommunity), owns (E− commerce Service,AddressWithoutCommunity)}).
Request (E− commerce Service, officePhone) ≡ ({E− commerce Service,officePhone, SC (officePhone), ¬owns (E− commerce Service,officePhone)}, {¬SC (officePhone), owns (E− commerce Service,officePhone)}).
In the meantime, start monitor E−commerce to check whether match with PDA 4 , PDA 5 , PDA 6 ,
Request (Seller, realName) ≡ ({Seller,realName, E− commerce Service (realName), ¬owns (Seller,realName)}, {¬E− commerce Service (realName), owns (Seller, realName)}).
Request (Seller, AddressWithoutCommunity) ≡ ({Seller, AddressWithoutCommunity, E− commerce Service (AddressWithoutCommunity), ¬owns (Seller, AddressWithout Community)}, {¬E− commerce Service (AddressWithoutCommunity), owns (Seller,AddressWithoutCommunity)}).
Request (Seller, realName) ≡ ({Seller,officePhone, E− commerce Service (officePhone), ¬owns (Seller,officePhone)}, {¬E− commerce Service (officePhone), owns (Seller,officePhone)}).
In the meantime, start monitoring Seller to check whether match with PDA 7 , PDA 8 , PDA 9 ,
Request (Shipper,realName) ≡ ({Shipper,,realName, Seller (realName), ¬owns (Shipper,,realName)}, {¬Seller (realName), owns (Shipper,,realName)}).
Request (Shipper,, AddressWithoutCommunity) ≡ ({Shipper,,AddressWithoutCommunity, Seller (AddressWithoutCommunity), ¬owns (Shipper,,AddressWithout Community)}, {¬Seller (AddressWithoutCommunity), owns (Shipper,,AddressWithoutCommunity)}).
Request (Shipper,, realName) ≡ ({Shipper,,officePhone, Seller (officePhone), ¬owns (Shipper,,officePhone)}, {¬Seller (officePhone), owns (Shipper,,officePhone)}).
In the meantime, start monitor Shipper to check whether match with PDA 10 , PDA 11 , PDA 12 , In the end, check timer Wait whether match with PDA 13 ,
∧ ≤ 10min(vaildtime); VOLUME 5, 2017 FIGURE 8. BPEL graphic supervising process.
B. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this paper, our experiments are implemented on a 2.30GHz Intel Core2Duo T6600 with 4GB of RAM. We adopt Apache ODE (Orchestration Director Engine) as the BPEL execution engine and extend Check and Supervisor activity to support monitoring collaborative interaction among service participants. First, we define the point cut (Check activity) to implement the BPEL self-check function, which mainly checks whether service participants meet AS. The implementation code is shown below. <check> <pointcut name="checktustDegree"> //process//invoke[@portType="CheckInv" and @peration="checktustDegree" </pointcut> <pointcut name="checkAS"> //process//invoke[@portType="CheckInv" and @peration="checkcutAS" </check> Second, if the service participants do not meet AS, then BPEL starts Event-handler. The implementation code is shown below. <scope> <faultHandlers> <catch faultName="ASunsatisfied"> <match name="serviceproviderReplaced" /> </catch> </faultHandlers> <invoke partnerLink="newServiceprovider" portType="service" operation="changeBinding" . . . /> <throw faultName="ASunsatisfied" /> </scope> Third, if the service participants meet AS, BPEL starts Privacy-supervisor to monitor participant behavior and then matches the hand-marked supervising log with the privacy requirement. The implementation code is shown below. <scope> <supervisor> <catch portType="service"> <match name="E-commerce" /> </catch> </supervisor> <invoke partnerLink="servicesupervisor" portType="supervisor-service" operation="supervising" . . . /> </scope> Experiment 1 (Performance Measurement): We considered some 1000 process executions, for a grand total of 6826 BPEL activities. We evaluated the time the Supervision Manager takes to stop the process and check for a supervision rule. This amounts to the time lost, regardless of the presence of supervision rules. The results are as shown in Fig. 9 . The average time spent on Privacy-supervisor activity was 28 ms and on Checker activity was 16 ms. We tried to execute the process without any supervision rules and calculated an average execution time of 338 ms for each activity. Therefore, if all services are run locally, our modification can be accounted for 1/12 of the time. If services were to be run on a network and were real services, the actual impact would be proportionately less since we would need to consider the delays introduced by the network when the process interacts with its partner services. for each correspondingly to test the privacy disclosure rate of checking. The log was analyzed after process execution by adopting a semi-manual pattern. The activities for which exceptions emerge were regarded as failures of privacy disclosure checking. The privacy exposure rate was calculated by checking different runtimes. The results are shown in Fig.10 .
When the activity data remain invariable with time, the privacy disclosure rate of checking increases. This is because more activities will be executed in a longer runtime. Therefore, the number of checking activities and checking rate will increase also. When the runtime remains unchanged, there are two cases to discuss. One is the condition in which the runtime is less than the time cost of the current activity's execution; in this case, with increasing number of activities, the checking rate decreases. This can be explained by the fact that some activities are not executed in a short time, so these activities are not included in the checking. The other case is the condition in which the runtime is not less than the time cost of the activity's execution. In this case, with increasing number of activities, the checking rate increases also. This is because all activities tested are executed. In addition, these activities are taken as checking with their own executions.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
According to the interaction characters among SaaS services, we propose a privacy disclosure checking method that satisfies users' requirements. We develop a prototype system, which describes the users' privacy requirements and extends BPEL and its execution engine to meet users' privacy requirements. We also design a case and run it on the prototype system to confirm the feasibility and correctness of our method.
Our approach can check privacy disclosure behavior among SaaS services, which can effectively prevent service participants from maliciously disclosing users' privacy information, increase service credibility, and provide a basis for privacy protection-oriented credibility measurement.
The next step is to detect the release of the data of users' privacy, analyze the data, and discretize the dataset that may be exposed to protect users' privacy before they are released.
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